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MIDWEST INDUSTRIES v. KARA VAN TRAILERS:
FEDERAL CIRCUIT REVERSES EARLIER
OPINIONS AND EXPANDS CONTROL OVER
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAIMS
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Introduction and Overview of Midwest
In a recent decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit reversed its well-established doctrine regarding
preemption of state intellectual property law by federal patent law, and
arguably contradicted its Congressionally granted authority.! The court,
in a landmark en banc decision authored by Justice Bryson, declared
that when causes of action under state law conflict with federal patent
laws the Federal Circuit would apply its own law, not the law of the
regional circuit from which the case came, to determine whether the
state law is preempted by federal patent laws.2 In so doing, the Federal
Circuit held that it had the authority to preempt state laws that are
"foreclosed" by federal patent law.3 Further, the court overruled a 1984
Federal Circuit decision in which the court held that in cases involving
both patent and nonpatent issues it would apply its own law with respect
to the patent issues, and apply the law of the regional circuit from which
the case came to the nonpatent issues.
4
This decision is a dramatic change for the Federal Circuit, which had
previously held that Federal Circuit law did not preempt state laws in
nonpatent areas.5 Instead, the Federal Circuit had previously held that,
while it could hear cases involving combined patent and nonpatent
issues, it would use the law of the regional circuit, in which the district
1. Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied,
528 U.S. 1019 (1999).
2. Id. at 1358-59.
3. Id. at 1360.
4. Id. at 1358-59.
5. Id. at 1358 (overruling Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318,
1333 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert denied, 525 U.S. 1143 (1999); Cable Elec. Prod., Inc. v. Genmark,
Inc., 770 F.2d 1015,1029 (Fed. Cir. 1985); and Interpart Corp. v. Italia, 777 F.2d 678, 684 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) ).
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court hearing the case sits, to decide the nonpatent issues.'
Nevertheless, the court's decision was the correct one.
The Midwest decision, while certainly a change in doctrine, is
consistent with the trend of recent decisions by the Federal Circuit
evidencing the court's desire to infuse consistency into American
intellectual property law.' Moreover, this decision is the logical and
necessary step, to among other things, decreasing forum-shopping.8 By
providing a uniform body of law regarding these issues, there is less
incentive for litigants to forum-shop. Additionally, it is arguable that
intellectual property could be more effectively governed at the national
level. Also of significant importance is a question of judicial
competence, particularly given the apparent increase in complexity and
abundance of intellectual property litigation.
Therefore, the Midwest decision was the logical and necessary step
in strengthening intellectual property law by judicial recognition of the
increasing interrelationship of different forms of intellectual property,
and by providing cohesion among the different intellectual property
disciplines.
B. Scope of this Comment
The purpose of this Comment is to evaluate how the Midwest
decision has affected the federal preemption doctrine as it relates to
intellectual property law and to explain the implications of this decision.
Moreover, it is the author's intention to explain why this decision was
the correct one. Part II will start with a review of the preemption
doctrine and explain its importance as it affects intellectual property
litigation. In Part III, this Comment will discuss the history and
evolution of the most important Federal Circuit and Supreme Court
cases dealing with preemption. Part IV of this Comment will discuss the
Midwest decision and the resultant changes. Part V will conclude with a
discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the Midwest decision.
6. Hunter Douglas, 153 F.3d at 1333; Cable Elec., 770 F.2d at 1029; Interpart, 777 F.2d at
684.
7. See discussion of Cable Electric, infra Part III.B, Interpart Corp., infra Part III.C, and
Hunter Douglas, infra Part III.D.
8. S. REP. No. 97-275, at 5 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15 (explaining that
the Federal Circuit was created to promote uniformity and decrease forum-shopping).
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II. PREEMPTION
A. Preemption Generally
The preemption doctrine is based on the Supremacy Clause of
Article VI of the United States Constitution, which declares that federal
law is the "supreme law of the land."' Therefore, any state law which
interferes with the enforcement of a federal law is preempted. The
essence of preemption is conflict." When evaluating a potential conffict
the court will look at both "the purposes and effects of both the federal
and the state laws."1
There are three different ways that federal law may preempt state
law, including explicit preemption, field preemption, and conflict
preemption. 2 Explicit preemption occurs where Congress explicitly
mandates that federal law will supersede related state law.1 3  Field
preemption, on the other hand, occurs when "the scheme of federal
regulation is so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that
Congress..." 4 "intended the Federal Government to occupy [an area
of law] exclusively.""5  Conflict preemption occurs where there is a
conflict between a state and a federal statute and it is impossible to
comply with both statutes. 6
B. Preemption in Intellectual Property
The United States Constitution grants Congress exclusive legislative
control over patents and copyrights. 7 Congress has exercised this
9. David Hricik, Remedies of the Infringer: The Use By the Infringer of Implied and
Common Law Federal Rights, State Claims, and Contract to Shift Liability for Infringement of
Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks, 28 TEx. TECH. L. Rnv. 1027, 1072 (1997) (citing U.S.
CONsT. art. I, § 1, ci. 2.); see also, Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824) (holding
that the New York attempt to issue licenses excluding competitors from coastal trade was
preempted by an act of Congress).
10. Jane Ginsburg, Second Frankfurt-Columbia Symposium on Comparative Law
Harmonization of Laws in Federal Systems: A Comparative Perspective Intellectual Property, 2
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 463,466 (1996).
11. Id.
12. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72,78-79 (1990).
13. Hricik, supra note 9, at 1072.
14. Id.
15. English, 496 U.S. at 79.
16. Hricik, supra note 9, at 1076.
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 8 (granting Congress the authority "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
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control, preempting state regulation of these areas. Congress has
effectuated judicial control of patents by granting the Federal Circuit
the authority to review patent appeals. 9 However, Congress has left
significant, although not exclusive, authority in the states to regulate
trademarks.?0
Preemption in intellectual property law is by no means a new
concept; on the contrary, federal courts found preemption in numerous
intellectual property cases as early as 1964.2'  However, federal
preemption of intellectual property was traditionally restrained in scope
to patents and copyrights with concurrent state and federal regulation of
trademarks and unfair competition.'
C. Traditionally State Areas
While the administration of patents and copyright concerns
generally falls within the authority of the federal government, the states
have been allowed to exercise significant, if not exclusive, control over
most other intellectual property issues.as Traditional areas of exclusive
state law include publicity rights and some forms of idea protection.24
However, the line between state and federal jurisdiction is not
always clearly defined, nor is it necessarily the most optimal division.
Conflict between state and federal law is inevitable.' "[E]ven though a
state may not have deliberately erected a competing regime for
18. 35 U.S.C. § 1-376 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999); 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1994 & Supp. V
2000); see also Bonito Boats Inc. v. Thundercraft Boats Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152 (1989) (ruling
that state control of intellectual property is preempted where it clashes with congressional
regulation).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999) (granting the Federal Circuit exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over patent appeals); 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999)
(establishing original jurisdiction for patent cases in the federal district courts); see also S.
REP. No. 275 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1981); H. R. Rep. No. 312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-22
(1981).
20. Ginsburg, supra note 10, at 465.
21. Katherine F. Horvath, Comment, NBA v. Motorola: A Case for Federal Preemption
of Misappropriationl 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 461, 471 (1998) (stating that
"[p]reemption... became a constitutional issue after two 1964 cases") (citing Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225,229 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Bright Lighting, Inc., 376
U.S. 234 (1964))); see also Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 141.
22. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 154 (discussing Sears, 376 U.S. at 232).
23. Sears, 376 U.S. at 232 (holding that states "may protect businesses in the use of their
trademarks, labels, or distinctive dress in the packaging of goods so as to prevent others, by
imitating such markings, from misleading purchasers as to the source of goods").
24. Ginsburg, supra note 10, at 465 (citing J. T. MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PRIVACY
AND PUBLICITY § 6.3 (1987)).
25. Id. at 466.
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regulating an area controlled by national law, application of state law in
a given situation may produce results inconsistent with federal policy."'
If such conflict is present, then the federal regulation may preempt the
state regulation.
IIl. HISTORY
A. History of The Federal Circuit
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was
created by Congress in 1982 as an Article III Court.2 The court was
given unlimited geographic jurisdiction but limited subject matter
jurisdiction.29 The court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases
arising "under any Act of Congress relating to patents."30 Most Federal
Circuit patent cases come up on appeal from one of the eighty-five
regional federal district courts.3
The following four sections analyze the jurisprudence of preemption
over the Federal Circuit's relatively short history, including three cases
which precede and foreshadow the Midwest decision, demonstrating the
Federal Circuit's increasing acceptance of the need for a uniform body
of laws governing intellectual property issues ancillary to patent law.
B. Cable Electric Products, Inc. v. Genmark, Inc.
The Federal Circuit addressed preemption of state law with respect
to intellectual property in Cable Electric Products, Inc. v. Genmark,
Inc.32 The court held that when called upon to determine whether a
federal patent law preempts particular state law causes of action or
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See SHELDON W. HALPERN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF UNITED STATES
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COPYRIGHTS, PATENT, AND TRADEMARK 185 (1999).
29. Id.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). In addition to appeals related to
patents the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction also includes appellate jurisdiction over The Boards
of Contract Appeal, The Court of International Trade, The United States Court of Federal
Claims, The Court of Veterans Appeals, The International Trade Commission, The Merit
Systems Protection Board, The Patent and Trademark Office and cases pertaining to matters
of unfair competition originating in the United States District Courts. See DONALD S.
CHISUM Er AL, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 26-28 (1998).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999) (granting the district courts original
jurisdiction over patent cases); see also 28 U.S.C. § 133 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999) (listing the
eighty-five district courts).
32. 770 F.2d 1015,1033 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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conflicts with rights created by other federal laws, the Federal Circuit
would apply the law of the circuit from which the case came.3 The
Federal Circuit overruled this part of Cable Electric in Midwest, opining
that Federal Circuit law would be controlling.' In Midwest, the court
reasoned that a change was necessary to establish uniformity, discourage
inclusion of frivolous patent causes of action simply to gain an
advantageous body of law with respect to nonpatent issues, and to
reduce forum-shopping.35
The Federal Circuit decided Cable Electric in 1985 on appeal from
the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.3
Cable Electric owns United States Patent No. 4,343,032 [hereinafter
'032] related to an electric lamp with a photo-sensor. Cable Electric
alleged that Genmark infringed Cable Electric's '032 patent, and
violated federal false designation of origin laws, state unfair competition
laws, and state trademark infringement laws.'
The Federal Circuit determined that they had jurisdiction to hear
arguments concerning the nonpatent issues of the case. 9 However the
court held that:
[I]n deciding these nonpatent matters we do so 'in the light of the
problems faced by the district court from which each count
originated, including the law there applicable', and in the
33. Id.
34. Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1358-59 (Fed. Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1019 (1999).
35. Id. at 1359.
36. Cable Elec., 770 F.2d at 1018 (reviewing Cable Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Genmark, Inc.,
582 F.Supp. 93 (N.D. Cal. 1984)).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1029 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1982); Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolster's Tire
Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 907-09 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d
1422 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (en banc)).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive
jurisdiction - (1) of an appeal from a final decision of a district court of the United
States, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the
District Court of Guam, the District Court of the Virgin Islands, or the District
Court for the northern Mariana Islands, if the jurisdiction of that court was based, in
whole or in part, on section 1338 of this title, except that a case involving a claim
arising under any Act of Congress relating to copyrights or trademarks and no other
claims under § 1338(a) shall be governed by Sections 1291, 1292, and 1294 of this
title.
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
[Vol. 84:659
2001] MIDWEST INDUSTRIES v. KARAVAN TRAILERS 665
remaining portions of this opinion we will be guided by the
relevant law in the Ninth Circuit, to the extent it can be
discerned.'
To support this position the Federal Circuit relied upon Atari: "it
will be the role and duty of the advocates to brief and argue [the
nonpatent counts] in the appeal... just as if they were appearing...
before that circuit [from which the case originated]." '4 The Federal
Circuit in Atari declared that in the future, nonpatent issues would be
decided using the law from the appropriate regional circuit.42
The Federal Circuit reasoned that it has exclusive jurisdiction over
decisions from the district courts concerning patent cases and over issues
involving or related to patent law as enunciated in 28 U.S.C. § 1338.4'
The court recognized that in creating the Federal Circuit, Congress
intended to create uniformity, reduce forum-shopping, and create a
uniform body of law governing patents.44 The court also declared that
its jurisdiction extended beyond patent claims, possibly foreshadowing
the Midwest decision. "[S]ection 1295(a)(1) does not limit the
jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit over appeals from the district courts
exclusively to the review of claims based on the patent laws." 
45
The court held that when a patent claim and a nonpatent claim are
connected, the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over both claims.' The
Federal Circuit reasoned that this is necessary for judicial efficiency,
stating that to hold otherwise would result in bifurcation-the patent
issue being appealed to the Federal Circuit and the nonpatent issue to
the regional circuit.4 However, when explaining the Federal Circuit's
preemptive powers, the court held that in such "mixed case[s]" involving
both patent and nonpatent issues the law of the regional circuit would
40. Cable Elec., 770 F.2d at 1029 (quoting Bandag, 750 F.2d at 909 (citing Atari, 747 F.2d
at 1440)).
41. Id. at 1029 n.18 (quoting Atari, 747 F.2d at 1440).
42. See id. (citing Atari, 747 F.2d at 1440).
43. Id. at 1032 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999)).
44. Id. Interestingly, the court suggested the same reasoning of increasing doctrinal
uniformity and reducing forum shopping in Midwest to support overruling Cable Electric. See
Midwest, 175 F.3d at 1359. "We apply Federal Circuit law to patent issues in order to serve
one of the principle purposes for the creation of this court: to promote uniformity in the
law... and to minimize the incentive for forum-shopping." Id.
45. Cable Elec., 770 F.2d at 1032.
46. Id.
47. Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No 312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1981) (quoted and discussed in
Atari, 747 F.2d at 1435)).
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apply to the nonpatent issues while Federal Circuit law would control
the patent issues.'
In Midwest, the court affirmed Cable Electric to the extent that the
Federal Circuit has the authority to hear and determine cases involving
state intellectual property laws.49  However, in Midwest, the Federal
Circuit held that it would not apply the law of the regional circuit, opting
instead to apply Federal Circuit law."
C. Interpart Corp. v. Italia S.p.A.
The Midwest decision also explicitly overruled Interpart.5 In
Interpart the Federal Circuit held that it did not have jurisdiction over a
case that related to copyrights and trademarks, even though the
trademarks and copyrights were related to the patent that was the
subject of the case before the Federal Circuit.' In holding this way, the
Federal Circuit evaluated whether California's plug molding statute was
preempted by federal law. 3
In Interpart, the Federal Circuit enunciated the standard for
preemption to be "whether [the] law 'stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."'''  The court further clarified the test for preemption by
stating that "the state law must fail if it 'clashes with the objectives of
the federal patent laws."'55  Using this more conservative test for
preemption, the Federal Circuit found that preemption did not apply
because the California law had a different objective than federal patent
law and therefore did not clash with federal patent law. 6
The test in Interpart is based on a subjective determination of
whether the state law conflicts with the purpose of federal patent law.
48. Id. at 1033 (discussing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964)
and Compco Corp. v. Day-Bright Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964)) (referring to the Federal
Circuit's practice of applying the law of the regional circuit).
49. Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1359 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 1019 (1999).
50. Id. at 1358-59.
51. Id. at 1359 (overruling Interpart Corp. v. Italia, 777 F.2d 678 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
52. Interpart, 777 F.2d 678, 680 (holding that federal patent law did not preempt state
unfair competition law relating to a plug molding process).
53. Id. at 684 (construing CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17300 (West Supp. 1985)).
54. Id. (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S 470 (1973) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,67 (1941))).
55. Id. (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225,231 (1964)).
56. Id. at 685.
57. Id.
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Conversely, the new, apparently more liberal standard for preemption
enunciated in Midwest is whether the federal patent law is affected by
the state nonpatent law or whether the state cause of action is
"foreclosed by patent law. "" Therefore, according to the Midwest test,
the existence of a conflict is not determinative; instead, whether there is
interaction between the areas of coverage is hereafter determinative.
D. Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc.
Midwest also overruled the more recent Federal Circuit decision of
Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc.5 1 The Hunter Douglas
decision provided a much more liberal approach to federal preemption
than Interpart.60 Consequently, it could be argued that Hunter Douglas
was simply meant by the Federal Circuit to serve as a transition prior to
the Midwest decision. Thus, the question is whether the Midwest
decision was in fact consistent with an increasingly liberal approach by
the Federal Circuit to preemption.
The court held in Hunter Douglas that "federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over state law causes of action in which a substantial
question of federal patent law is pleaded as a necessary element of that
claim., 61  In addition, the court enunciated two other points of
significance for understanding Midwest. First, Hunter Douglas
concluded that federal courts have jurisdiction over cases arising under
federal patent law.6 Second, the court cautioned against overuse of
federal preemption and suggested that the states still have significant
authority over nonpatent causes of action when they do not involve
patent law.6
The Federal Circuit in Hunter Douglas explained that in order for a
district court, and therefore, the Federal Circuit, to have jurisdiction
58. Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 1019 (1999); see also Pro-Mold & Tool Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 75
F.3d 1568, 1571 (applying the "foreclosed by patent law" standard to "mixed" questions of
patent and nonpatent law).
59. 153 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (deciding whether window shade patents were invalid
and whether state unfair competition laws were violated).
60. 777 F.2d at 678.
61. 153 F.3d at 1321.
62. Id. at 1324 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999)).
63. Id. at 1333-34 (holding that state law causes of action should not be lightly
preempted by federal law); see also id. at 1334 (holding that "state unfair competition law
regulates conduct in a different field from patent law") (citing Dow Chem. Co. v. Exxon
Corp., 139 F.3d 1470,1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
2001]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
over a case or controversy it must "arise[] under patent law.""6 The
standard of "arising under" comes from a combination of Article III of
United States Constitution, which extends power to federal courts to
hear cases "arising under federal law," and 28 U.S.C. § 1338, which
grants jurisdiction to federal district courts over "cases arising under any
Act of Congress relating to patents."' The "'arising under' patent law"
standard is significant because the Federal Circuit relies upon this
language in Midwest in order to extend the Court's authority to include
nonpatent issues that "pertain to patent law."66 Although the Federal
Circuit held that federal patent law was not controlling in Hunter
Douglas, the case is significant because the court recognized its
supremacy over nonpatent issues when they have a certain relation to
patent law.67
While the court applied a more liberal approach to preemption than
it did in Interpart, the court still followed a relatively conservative
approach when determining what "arises under patent law.""6
Additionally, the Hunter Douglas decision evidenced the court's
deference to state control and cautioned against overuse of the
preemption doctrine with respect to nonpatent issues. "Congress does
not 'cavalierly' preempt state law causes of action, for the 'States are
independent sovereigns in our federal system."'6 9 Moreover, the court
reiterated the principle that state police powers are not preempted
unless it is clear that Congress intended to preempt those powers.' The
court proceeded to conclude that Congress did not intend to preempt
state unfair competition law."
64. Id. at 1325.
65. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 1; and 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1994 & Supp. IV
1999)). "[A]lthough Article III empowers federal courts to hear cases 'arising under' federal
law, a federal district court may only exercise jurisdiction pursuant to a congressional
enactment." Id.
66. 175 F.3d at 1359 (holding that an issue is "governed by Federal Circuit law if the
issue 'pertain[s] to patent law"') (citing Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d
1564, 1574-75 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
67. 153 F.3d at 1325 (holding that the federal courts do not have jurisdiction over a
nonfederal cause of action unless the vindication of the nonfederally protected right is
intimately related to patent law).
68. Id. at 1324 (applying 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)).
69. Id. at 1332 (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,485 (1996)).
70. Id. (holding that "'[tihe historic police powers of the States were not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress,'
particularly when Congress has 'legislated... in a field which the States have traditionally
occupied."' (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,230 (1947))).
71. Id. at 1333. "We readily conclude that, in accordance with Dow Chemical, there is
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Finally, the most important aspect of the Hunter Douglas decision,
with respect to preemption, was that even when patent issues, over
which the Federal Circuit undeniably has jurisdiction, are present, state
law should still govern nonpatent issues?72 "[S]tate law governs the
maintenance of orderly contractual relations and this function is not
preempted merely because patents and patent issues are presented in
the substance of those contracts. "73
E. Historical Approach to Preemption in Intellectual Property
In a 1991 Federal Circuit decision, the court explained what was then
its approach to preemption and to the regional circuits: "[O]ur initial
inquiry in determining whether deference to regional circuit law is due
has been to decide whether the law that must be applied, whether
procedural or substantive, is one '... over which this court does not have
exclusive appellate jurisdiction.' "
The court considered four factors when deciding whether it had
jurisdiction.' First, the court determined whether an issue was
"uniquely" related to patent law. 6 Second, the court weighed whether a
procedural issue was related to patent law Third, the court inquired
into the need for and their ability to create uniform law on a subject
Fourth, the Federal Circuit exercised restraint where there was already
uniformity among the regional circuits, thereby recognizing the
advantages of national uniformity in the law.79
IV. MIDWEST-A MAJOR CHANGE?
A. Summary of Midwest Industries
The Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, decided Midwest Industries, Inc.
no reason to believe that the clear and manifest purpose of Congress was for Federal patent
law to occupy exclusively the field pertaining to state unfair competition law." Id. at 1333-34
(citing Dow Chem. Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470, 1471-79 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
72. Id. at 1334.
73. Id. (quoting Dow Chemical, 139 F.3d at 1478).
74. Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 855-56 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(quoting Cicena Ltd. v. Columbia Telecomm. Group, 900 F.2d 1546, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
75. Id. at 856.
76. Id. (citing Kalman v. Berlyn Corp., 914 F.2d 1473,1480 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
77. Id. (citing Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Auto Body Panels of Ohio, Inc., 908 F.2d 951,
953 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
78. Id. (citing Forman v. United States, 767 F.2d 875, 880 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
79. Id.
2001]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
v. Karavan Trailers, Inc. on May 5, 1999.' The case involved two
competing manufacturers of trailers." The case is based, in large part,
upon U.S. Patent No. 5,518,261 (the '261 patent), which relates to a
winch post.8 Midwest sued Karavan in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa, claiming that Karavan was infringing
two of Midwest's design patents and was violating Midwest's federal and
state (Iowa) trademark rights. Surprisingly, Midwest did not allege
that Karavan infringed Midwest's '261 utility patent.84
At trial, before the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Iowa, Karavan requested that Midwest's nonpatent-related
claims be dismissed." Karavan's contention was that federal and state
design protection improperly extended the '261 patent." The district
court granted Karavan's motion for dismissal on the nonpatent claims,
concluding that those claims were preempted by federal patent lawY
The court concluded that because the curved winch post is disclosed in
the '261 patent and claimed in one of the dependent claims of that
patent, it is a "significant inventive component" of the patent and
therefore not entitled to Lanham Act protection for trade dress."
Midwest subsequently appealed to the Federal Circuit.'
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgement, ruling "that patent law principles foreclose[d] Midwest's
Lanham Act and state law claims." 9 The Federal Circuit held that even
80. Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir.), cert denied,
528 U.S. 1019 (1999).
81. Id. at 1357.
82. Id. at 1357-58. Claim ten of the '261 patent "recites as a limitation, a winch post that
'curve[s] forwardly and upwardly."' Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1358.
85. Id. Karavan filed its motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
for failure to state a claim. Id.
86. Id.; see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989)
(holding that state unfair competition law could not be used to extend patent rights).
87. Midwest, 175 F.3d at 1358 (citing Vomado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft
Corp., 58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1995)). "To offer trade dress protection to a product
configuration that embodies significant features of patented products would interfere with the
public's ability to practice patented inventions after the patents have expired." Vornado, 58
F.3d at 1508. "Accordingly, the court held that a product configuration may not be accorded
protection under the Lanham Act when the configuration is a 'described, significant inventive
aspect' of an issued utility patent." Id. at 1510.
88. Midwest, 175 F.3d at 1358.
89. Id. at 1358.
90. Id. at 1361.
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though the curved winch post was claimed in the '261 patent and was a
"significant inventive aspect of the patent," it may still be deserving of
trade dress protection.91 Moreover, the Federal Circuit held that the
winch post could not be denied trade dress protection just because it was
a "significant inventive aspect" of a utility patent.'
B. Explanation of Midwest Decision
The Midwest decision constituted a significant change in intellectual
property law. Henceforth, when state laws conflict with federal patent
laws, the Federal Circuit will apply its own law to determine if the state's
laws are preempted by federal patent law.' Therefore, Federal Circuit
jurisprudence controls conflict and preemption questions? 4 The law of
the regional circuits will no longer have any bearing on the
interrelationship between patent law and state intellectual property
laws, nor will it control the relationship between patent law and other
federal intellectual property rights.95 All of this begs the question: What
is the Federal Circuit law governing preemption?
1. Patent/Nonpatent Distinction Rejected
In the Midwest decision the court examined a 1989 Federal Circuit
decision in which it held that the Federal Circuit should apply its own
law to patent issues but apply regional circuit law to nonpatent issues.9
Unfortunately, the distinction between patent and nonpatent issues has
never been clear.' Initially, the Federal Circuit had attempted to clarify
the patent/nonpatent question by explaining that their law would
control substantive patent law issues and issues which "pertain to patent
law.""' However, this distinction proved to be unworkable. In a number
of cases between 1984 and the 1999 Midwest decision, the court
attempted to establish a workable distinction between patent and
nonpatent issues, and therefore between issues that were controlled by
Federal Circuit law and issues that were controlled by regional circuit
91. Id. at 1364.
92. Id. at 1364 (citing Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1510).
93. Id. at 1358-59.
94. Id. at 1361.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1359 (citing Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1440 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (en banc)).
97. Id.
98. Id. (citing Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574-75 (Fed.
Cir. 1984)).
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law.' This distinction proved to be more elusive than the Federal
Circuit apparently expected, thus necessitating the clarification provided
in Midwest.
In Midwest, the Federal Circuit finally rejected this complicated
analysis and held that it would apply its "[own] construction of patent
law to the questions whether and to what extent patent law preempts or
conflicts with other causes of action."" Therefore, the court decided
that Federal Circuit precedent would determine what patent law permits
and what patent law prohibits with respect to Midwest's state and
federal trademark claims.10 1
2. "Functionality" Requirement
In Midwest, the court ruled that Midwest's trademark and state trade
dress protection of its winch post did not improperly extend Midwest's
'261 patent, which claimed a winch post. 2 The court recognized that, if
used improperly, trade dress protection may unfairly extend patent
rights and discourage competition.'O3 However, this does not mean that
the existence of a patent precludes per se protection of similar features
under either state unfair competition law or federal trade dress law.,°4
To protect against an anti-competitive extension of patent rights by
trademarks or unfair competition law, the Federal Circuit has invoked
the "functionality" requirement.05 The Federal Circuit explained that
functionality, not the existence of a patent, either valid or expired,
determines whether a trademark or unfair competition protection is
valid.' 6
99. Id. at 1359 (citing Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1564
(Fed. Cir. 1994); Biodex Corp. v. Loredon Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 858-59 (Fed. Cir.
1991); Gardco Mfg., Inc. v. Herst Lighting Co., 820 F.2d 1209, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Panduit,
744 F.2d at 1574-75)).
100. Id. at 1360.
101. Id. at 1361.
102. Id. at 1364.
103. Id. at 1361 (citing In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 501 (C.C.P.A.
1961)); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989) (holding that
state intellectual property law could not create patent-like rights or extend federal patents).
104. Id. at 1362 (citing In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 930 (C.C.P.A.
1964) (discussing that trademark rights and unfair competition rights do not extend patent
rights, but are independent and provide different protection)).
105. Id. (citing Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995); see also
Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527, 1530-31 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
106. Id. (holding that "the fact that a patent has been acquired does not convert what
otherwise would have been protected trade dress into nonprotected matter").
[Vol. 84:659
MIDWEST INDUSTRIES v. KARAVAN TRAILERS
3. Federal Circuit Rejects "Significant Aspect" Test
Reiterating the Federal Circuit's reliance upon "functionality" in
determining the validity of trademark and unfair competition
protection, the Federal Circuit rejected the Tenth Circuit's ruling that
unfair competition and trademark laws do not protect a product
configuration that is claimed in a patent and is "a significant inventive
aspect" of the patented invention.'O' Whether or not a feature is
described or even whether it is a "significant inventive aspect" of a
patent is irrelevant in determining trade dress protection." Finally,
because this issue involves a question of whether federal patent law
conflicts with or preempts state law, the law of the Federal Circuit, not
the Tenth Circuit, is controlling." Therefore, the Federal Circuit
remanded the case to the district court to determine the functionality of
the winch post design.1
4. State Law Trademark Statute
The court's decision regarding preemption and conflicts applies to
state law claims as well.' If a state law purports to grant trade dress
protection to a "functional" feature, the state law conflicts with and is
therefore preempted by federal patent law."' Therefore, the district
court was instructed to evaluate the functionality of the winch post when
determining whether the winch post may receive Iowa trademark
protection."' Finally, if the winch post serves "as a designation of
source" and the winch is not "functional," Midwest's state law claims
and federal trademark claims are not barred by, nor do they conflict
with, federal patent law.14  Accordingly, the "significant inventive
aspect" test described in Vornado was overruled."5
V. DISCUSSION OF THE MERITS OF THE MIDWEST DECISION
In order to fairly evaluate the merits of the Midwest decision, this
107. Id. at 1364 (citing Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d
1498, 1510 (10th Cir. 1995)).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1361.
110. Id. at 1365.
111. Id.
112. Id. (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 167 (1989)).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1364 (overruling Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58
F.3d 1498, 1510 (10th Cir. 1995)).
2001]
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section will explain some of the advantages and disadvantages of the
decision before concluding that the decision was the correct one.
A. Arguments in Favor of the Expansionist Approach Taken by the
Federal Circuit
1. National Regulation Provides for Uniformity
National regulation of intellectual property is certainly a more
efficient method of regulating "inventions, works of authorship, trade
symbols, and such, [which] resist confinement to local boundaries. 11 6
This is because intellectual property is inherently resistant to state-by-
state confinement.1
17
Clearly, the use of numerous, possibly conflicting, methods of
registration could only serve to frustrate efficiency, hamper
dissemination, reduce commercial certainty, and affect insecurity among
the intellectual property community1  Therefore, the centralization of
control resultant from the establishment of a standard set of judicial
precedents from a single court will provide the very desirable qualities
of both certainty and uniformity.
The Federal Circuit has long been concerned with the confusion and
the conflict likely to result from requiring district courts to apply
different laws dependent upon whether the case would be appealed to
the Federal Circuit or to the regional circuit."9 The Federal Circuit
reasoned that "[i]t would be at best unfair to hold in this case that the
district court, at risk of error, should have 'served two masters', or that it
should have looked, Janus-like, in two directions in its conduct.'" 0
"[T]he policy of achieving uniformity in district court management of
trials has been a significant factor in our occasional deference to
regional circuit law. "
12
116. Ginsburg, supra note 10, at 463.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Atari, Inc. v. J S & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1439 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (en banc);
see also In re Int'l Med. Prosthetics Research Assoc., Inc., 739 F.2d 618, 620 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
("Dealing daily with such ... [questions] a district court cannot and should not be asked to
answer them one way when the appeal on the merits will go to the regional circuit in which
the district court is located and in a different way when the appeal will come to [the Federal]
Circuit").
120. Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 856 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(quoting Atari, 747 F.2d at 1439).
121. Id.
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In Midwest, had the Federal Circuit not decided to apply its own law,
confusion between the circuits would have continued to exist. Counsel
for Karavan argued that Tenth Circuit law should be applied.
1
"
According to the Tenth Circuit, any state protection of a patented
invention is barred if the feature is a "significant inventive aspect" of a
patent.In Counsel for Midwest argued that Eighth Circuit law should be
applied.24 Under Eighth Circuit law, the existence of a patent did not
preclude state trade dress protection."
2. National Regulation Prevents Forum-Shopping
Another obvious advantage of uniformity is that it prevents forum-
shopping. Forum-shopping occurs when parties, aware of the
differences in law between the circuits, attempt to file their cases in the
circuit which they believe has the most favorable law for their case."'
The elimination of forum-shopping was one of the purposes for the
creation of the Federal Circuit." In creating the Federal Circuit,
Congress stated that, "[tihe creation of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit will produce desirable uniformity in this area of [patent]
law.'"' Applying different laws to the same matter, based solely upon
the circuit of origin, perpetuates disparities among the circuits and
creates a perception of unfairness and arbitrariness of the courts.
Therefore, Midwest is consistent with Congress's expressed intent in
creating the Federal Circuit.'29
122. See Anne Hiaring, Midwest Industries Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc. Case Note, 573
PLI/PAT 473,478 (1999).
123. Vornado Air Circulation Sys. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1510 (10th Cir.
1995).
124. Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers Corp., 175 F.3d 1356, 1358 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 1019 (1999).
125. Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1214-15 (8th Cir. 1976).
126. HALPERN ET AL., supra note 28, at 185.
127. Id.
128. S. Rep. No. 275, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1981), and H.R. Rep. No. 312, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. 20-22 (1981). In addressing the problem of forum shopping, Congress noted,
[S]ome circuit courts are regarded as 'pro-patent' and others 'anti-patent,' and much
time and money is expended in 'shopping' for a favorable venue .... [T]he validity
of a patent is too dependent upon geography to make effective business planning
possible... [the creation of] a single court of appeals for patent cases will promote
certainty where it is lacking to a significant degree and will reduce, if not eliminate,
the forum-shopping that now occurs.
Id.
129. S. Rep. No. 275, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1981); H.R. Rep. No. 312, 97th Cong., 1st
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Interestingly, the Federal Circuit used the same line of reasoning to
support its holding in Cable Electric that applying the law of the regional
circuit would prevent forum-shopping when it noted that "[s] uch a rule
will reduce the incentive for forum-shopping with respect to a significant
threshold issue in state causes of action. "'3 However, the appearance of
conflicting interpretations between the regional circuits, as
demonstrated in Midwest by the disparities between the law of the
Eighth and Tenth Circuits, has apparently proven to the Federal Circuit
that requiring the district courts to apply the law of the regional circuit
does not work.
3. The Constitutional Framers Intended National Regulation
Although Midwest is a significant change in doctrine, it can be
argued that the decision more closely achieved the constitutional
Framers' intentions with respect to the regulation and promotion of the
"useful Arts." 1 3'  By granting itself more control over the various
intellectual property disciplines, the Federal Circuit has made a more
nationalized system for the enforcement of intellectual property rights.'"
From what evidence we have of the Framers' intentions, with respect
to intellectual property law, it appears that they recognized the value of
nationalized control, at least with respect to copyrights and patents.
The little available evidence of the Framers' intent in including this
authority indicates that they recognized the inefficacy of disparate state
regulation of inventions and works of authorship: in Federalist No. 43
James Madison observed, "the utility of this power will scarcely be
questioned ... The States cannot separately make effectual provisions
for either... [copyright or patent]. 133
Further, it appears that they recognized the difficulty that the states
would have with respect to creating an effective system for the
regulation and enforcement of intellectual property issues."
4. The Federal Circuit is More Competent to Evaluate Intellectual
Sess. 20-22 (1981).
130. Cable Elec. Prods. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
131. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
132. Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1358-59 (Fed. Cir.),
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1019 (1999) (rejecting the application of regional circuit law to
traditionally state controlled issues).
133. Ginsburg, supra note 10, at 464 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 278-79 (James
Madison) (Modem Library ed., n.d.)).
134. Id.
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Property Causes of Action
Possibly the most pragmatic argument in favor of the Midwest
decision is that the Federal Circuit's docket is occupied by a significantly
larger number of intellectual property cases than any regional circuit.135
Therefore, it is logical to posit that the Federal Circuit, "trained in
exegesis," is more competent to decide issues of this type than the
regional circuits, which rarely hear state trademark and unfair
competition cases and never hear patent and copyright cases."
Conversely, a significant portion of the Federal Circuit's docket includes
state trademark and unfair competition claims combined with patent
and copyright cases."
5. Midwest's Expansion of Control is Consistent with Recent Expansion
of Authority
The Midwest decision is arguably consistent with some of the
Federal Circuit's previous holdings, that extended the court's authority
over a limited set of circumstances."3 The Federal Circuit has held that
its jurisdictional competence is bound solely by whether the question
before the court is "foreclosed by patent law. 1 39 In essence, the court
held that any issue that is significant to the outcome of a patent suit is
within the jurisdictional competence of the Federal Circuit."4
Therefore, the Midwest decision which dictates that Federal Circuit
precedent must be applied to "mixed" questions of patent and
nonpatent law is a logical extension of the court's earlier rulings.' In
135. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 27-28 (1998) (declaring that "clearly patent law
cases take up a greater percentage of the [Federal Circuit] court's time"). Approximately 8%
of the Federal Circuit's docket comes up on appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office
while an additional 19% are appeals from the district courts. Id.
136. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. 517 U.S. 370, 388-89 (1996) (holding that
judges, trained in exegesis, are likely to interpret patent claims better than lay jurors because
claim construction "is a special occupation, requiring, like all others, special training and
practice") (quoting Parker v. Hulme, 18 F. Cas. 1138,1140 (C.C.E.D. 1849) (No. 10740)).
137. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 30.
138. Atari, Inc. v. J S & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1429-30 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Biodex
Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 858-59 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that a
nonpatent issue is nonetheless governed by the Federal Circuit if it "bears an essential
relationship to matters committed to our exclusive control by statute").
139. Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 1019 (1999).
140. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999) (granting the Federal Circuit "original
jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents").
141. Midwest, 175 F.3d at 1360 (relying on Pro-Mold v. Great Lakes Plastics, 75 F.3d
1568 (Fed. Cir. 1996) and Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
support of this expansionist approach, the Federal Circuit reasons that
its
responsibility as the tribunal having sole appellate responsibility
for the development of patent law requires that [it does] more
than simply apply [its] law to questions of substantive patent law.
In order to fulfill [its] obligation of promoting uniformity in the
field of patent law, it is equally important to apply our
construction of patent law to the questions whether and to what
extent gatent law preempts or conflicts with other causes of
action.
In the Midwest decision, the Federal Circuit cited other cases where
it had intruded upon traditionally state issues and expanded its control
"beyond the limits of substantive patent law."'143 These include "whether
the district court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant in a patent
suit;' "44 "whether the plaintiff has established its right to preliminary
injunction in a patent case;"" "whether there is a sufficient controversy
between the parties to permit an accused infringer to bring an action
seeking a declaratory judgment of patent noninfringement or
invalidity;"'4' "whether a patentee is entitled to have the issue of
inequitable conduct tried in the jury trial that the patentee has
demanded on the issue of infringement;"' 47 and "whether particular
materials are relevant for purposes of discovery in a patent case under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26."148
The court, as a conciliatory gesture, conceded that its jurisdiction,
although growing beyond "the limits of substantive patent law," is still
bound by the requirement that it may only expand to include issues "in
which the disposition of nonpatent-law issues [are] affected by the
1998)).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1359-60.
144. Id. at 1359 (citing Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558,
1564 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
145. Id. (citing Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1451 n. 12 (Fed. Cir.
1988)).
146. Id. (citing Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Releasomers, Inc., 824 F.2d 953, 954-55
n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
147. Id. (citing Gardco Mfg., Inc., v. Herst Lighting Co., 820 F.2d 1209, 1212 (Fed. Cir.
1987)).
148. Id. (citing Truswal Sys. Corp. v. Hydro-Air Eng'g, Inc., 813 F.2d 1207, 1212 (Fed.
Cir. 1987) and FED. R. Civ. P. 26).
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special circumstances of the patent law setting in which those issues
arise." '49 In so conceding, the Federal Circuit seemed to say that it does
not intend to extend its authority ad infinitum, but that the court's
jurisdiction does have firm boundaries which the court will respect and
maintain.
In support of the expansionist approach in Midwest, the court cited
numerous instances where it had similarly used its patent jurisdiction to
decide nonpatent issues.'" Further, while the Midwest decision was an
expansion of the Federal Circuit's control into areas which it
traditionally did not govern, this is not an unprecedented move by the
court. Finally, possibly to stave off criticism that it is expanding its
authority unchecked into areas in which it does not belong, the Federal
Circuit cited areas in which its law does not control.
151
6. It Is Not Always Possible to Easily Separate Patent Issues from
Nonpatent Issues
The intellectual property bar over the past few years has come to
recognize a major change in intellectual property. Even the name itself
has changed, and so emphasizes the change; the term "intellectual
property law" has been coined, to include copyrights, publicity rights,
trademarks, patents, and licensing. Recognizing this change, the
Federal Circuit in Midwest concluded that characterizing an issue either
as a patent issue or nonpatent issue is becoming increasingly
complicated.52 Because trademark, copyright, and other intellectual
property causes of action are often so closely related to patent causes of
action, allowing regional circuit law over these issues would eviscerate
the court's control over patent issues.
B. Problems with the Approach Taken by the Federal Circuit
While the Midwest decision was both correct and necessary, there
are some gaps in the decision which need to be addressed by the court in
order to prevent confusion and provide further clarity to the intellectual
149. Id. at 1359-60 (discussing Pro-Mold v. Great Lakes Plastics, 75 F.3d 1568 (Fed. Cir.
1996) and NobeIpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
150. Id. (citing Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574-75 (Fed.
Cir. 1984); Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 858-59 (Fed. Cir. 1991);
Gardco Mfg., Inc. v. Herst Lighting Co., 820 F.2d 1209, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Beverly Hills
Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Hybritech, Inc. v.
Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446,1451 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Truswa4 813 F.2d at 1212).
151. Id. at 1361.
152. Id. at 1359.
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property bar. I will discuss these deficiencies in the following section.
1. Congressional Intent
Preemption is controlled by Congressional intent."' Therefore, the
controlling question with respect to Midwest is what Congress intended
with respect to nonpatent issues when it enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1338.
"'[T]he historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by
the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress,' particularly when Congress has 'legislated... in a field which
the States have traditionally occupied.' 4 Congressional intention is to
be strictly construed.55 Therefore, the most important consideration
should be Congress' intent with respect to which court should have
control over nonpatent issues in "mixed" cases.
The Federal Circuit's jurisprudence indicates that Congress's
intentions with respect to 28 U.S.C. § 1338 were not clear to the court.
In Hunter Douglas, the Federal Circuit "conclude[d] that, in accordance
with Dow Chemical, there is no reason to believe that the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress was for federal patent law to occupy
exclusively the field pertaining to state unfair competition law. '56
The court went on to show deference to state control by stating that
"state unfair competition law regulates conduct in a different field from
federal patent law. " "7
Only one year later the Federal Circuit appears to have overcome its
conservative approach to preemption, holding that Federal Circuit law
preempted both state and regional circuit law with respect to Iowa state
trademark law.'58 The discrepancies between the decisions are difficult
to justify and suggest at best a misunderstanding of Congressional intent
153. See generally Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824) (holding that state
laws were preempted by congressional action); see also Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic
Design, 153 F.3d 1318, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485
(1996); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); English v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990); Fidelity Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141,
153 (1982); Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963); Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,67 (1941)).
154. Hunter Douglas, 153 F.3d at 1332 (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230).
155. Id. at 1332.
156. Id. at 1333 (citing Dow Chem. Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470, 1471-79).
157. Id. at 1334 (citing Dow Chem., 139 F.3d at 1477).
158. See Midwest, Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1360-61 (Fed.
Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1019 (1999) ( "We will therefore apply our own law to the
question in this case-whether principles of patent law foreclose Midwest's claims under
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act and under Iowa state trademark law.").
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and at worst a reckless disregard for stare decisis.
2. Midwest Removes Inconsistency only to Replace it with Ambiguity
and Confusion
To support its holding the Federal Circuit explained that it was
necessary to overturn Cable Electric9 and Hunter Douglas'60 to promote
uniformity.61 "We apply Federal Circuit law.., to promote uniformity
in the law.' 62 The Federal Circuit reasoned that if it did not use
preemption its ability to decide a case would depend, not upon the
merits of the case, but on the regional circuit from whence the appeal
was made.'3 The court stated that "[i]n order to fulfill our obligation of
promoting uniformity in the field of patent law, it is equally important to
apply our construction of patent law to the questions whether and to
what extent patent law preempts or conflicts with other causes of
action." ' The question that arises after the Midwest decision is whether
Midwest promotes uniformity or whether it adds more confusion.
Unfortunately, while the source of the dispute is no longer
determinative, the distinction between issues "pertaining to patent law"
and those that do not pertain to patent law is not clear.'6 Further, the
clarification that the court gives, supposedly to provide assistance to the
district courts when faced with the decision of whether Federal Circuit
law applies, is still somewhat obtuse.
The Federal Circuit explained that an issue "pertain[s] to patent"'6
law if "as applied in a particular case, [it] is foreclosed by patent law."67
Assumedly, whether a nonpatent issue is foreclosed by patent law
depends upon whether or not it is determinative of the case; maybe the
issue is foreclosed by patent law if it is simply significant to the
determination of the case. Clearly, more clarification on this point is
necessary before the district courts and practitioners know whether
regional circuit law, state law, or Federal Circuit law is controlling on a
particular issue.
159. 770 F.2d 1015 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
160. 153 F.3d at 1318.
161. Midwest, 175 F.3d at 1359.
162. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 97-275, at 5 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15).
163. Id. at 1360.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1359 (citing Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574
(Fed. Cir. 1984)).
166. Id. (citing Panduit, 744 F.2d at 1574-75).
167. Id. at 1360.
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This distinction among regional circuit law, state law and Federal
Circuit law does not provide the clarification that many practitioners
had hoped for. However, it must be noted that judges are not permitted
to legislate from the bench and must limit their opinions to the
interpretations of the laws which control the cases and controversies
before them.16
3. Confusion Still Exists Between Where State Law Ends and Federal
Law Begins
The Federal Circuit acknowledged that some confusion might
remain after Midwest. 69  "[T]here is a risk that district courts and
litigators could find themselves confronting two differing lines of
authority when faced with conflicts between patent law and state or
federal trademark claims." '70 Unfortunately, the court mentions this
concern but fails to provide any firm parameters.
The only guidance that the Federal Circuit provides is that "patent
law principles foreclose[d] Midwest's Lanham Act and state law
claims."' The Federal Circuit also acknowledged that it does not have
appellate jurisdiction over all intellectual property issues."
VI. CONCLUSION
Henceforth, when state laws conflict with federal patent laws the
Federal Circuit will apply its own law to determine if the state's laws are
preempted by federal patent law. Therefore, Federal Circuit
jurisprudence controls conflict and preemption questions. The law of
the regional circuits will no longer have any bearing on the
interrelationship between patent law and state intellectual property
laws, nor will it control the relationship between patent law and other
federal intellectual property rights.
The Midwest decision was the logical and necessary step by a court
attempting to strengthen intellectual property law through ensuring
consistency and by a court which recognizes the increasing
168. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 215-18 (1974)
(explaining the federal standing doctrine).
169. Midwest, 175 F.3d at 1356.
170. Id. at 1361.
171. Id.
172. Id. ("We recognize, of course, that questions involving conflicts between patent law
and other causes of action can and do arise in cases over which this court does not have
appellate jurisdiction-cases in which claims under the Lanham Act or state law claims are
not joined with a claim under the Patent Act.").
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interrelationship of different forms of intellectual property and the need
to provide cohesion among the different intellectual property
disciplines. Further, Midwest furthers Congress's goal by serving as a
disincentive for litigants to engage in forum-shopping.
STEPHEN A. GIGOT
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